Shafer's theory of belief and the Bayesian theory of probability are two alternative and mutually inconsistent approaches toward modelling uncertainty in artificial in telligence. To help reduce the conflict between these two approaches, this paper reexammes expected utility theory -from which Bayesian probability theory is derived.
bility theory to become much more similar to Shaferian theory. 3. assign each event E a probability Pr(E) ( with 'EE EF Pr(E) + Pr(Fe) = 1) 4 . assess the utility of each decision given each foreseen event, u( di E) 5 . assess the utility of each decision given the unforeseen event Fe.
Expected utility theory then mandates choosing decision d over d* if L Pr(E)u(di E) � L Pr(E)u(d* I E) E EFvFc E EFvFc
It is common to implement step 5 by assuming ASSUMPTION 0: For some u0, u(diFe) = u0 for all d.
(1)
Given this assumption, the expected utility criterion in (1) remains valid with Pr( E) replaced by Pr(E I F) , enabling the decision maker to skip steps (2) and (5).
Unfortunately Assumption 0 is often inadequate. Thus frequently the utility of decision d given each atomic event E can be thought of as some well-defined function of m characteristics of event E. (See Keeney & Raiffa(1976) for further discussion of such multiattribute utility functions.) Now suppose an unforeseen event event IE occurs which
• is identica� to event E on almost all of these key m characteristics
• is quite different from any event other than E on these m characteristics Then the utility of decision d given IE is likely to be much closer to the utility of decision d given E, than it is to the utility of decision d given any event other than E. This violates Assumption 0.
The next section formalizes this notion of similarity between events and develops a revised version of Assumption 0. This revision of Assumption 0 is equivalent to replacing subjective probabilit;y theory over the full space of events F V Fe with nor malized commonalities over the space of foreseen events F. Since common ali ties are an alternate way of formulating the theory of lower probabilities ( Good( 1962) Suppose the utility of a decision given an atomic event E is completely determined by the event's characteristics, Ck(E), k = 1, . .. , m.
Hence if E and E* have precisely the same set of characteristics (i.e.,
We define the range of each characteristic as the set of all values it assumes for the various foreseen events. Suppose we then fix all characteristics but characteristic j at some reference level (e.g., their value at the status quo.) We define the importance of j as how much u( diE) can vary as we vary characteristic j over its range and vary d E D. We then renumber the characteristics1 in order of decreasing importance.
Consider a compound event, A, formed from the unwn of atomic events in F and suppose that all atomic events in .11 have the same first r characteristics (i.e., they agree on the r most important characteristics) but not the same :first r + 1 characteristics, i.e. Ck(E) = Ck(E*), E, E* E .!l, lc = l...r but Cr+t(E) =/= Cr+l(E*)
for some E, E* E A. We refer to these first r characteristics as compound event A's ch a.racteristi cs.
1 Note that the analyst could redefine his partition in terms of all possible occurrence of dif ferent m-tuples of characteristics. Since there are no unforeseen events in this partition, applying probability theory is straightforward. llut since utilities have not been defined over all possible occurrences of various m-tuples of characteristics, further assumptions are needed to specify the utilities form-tuples associated with unforeseen events. This need to specify utilities for unforeseen events leads to the approach used in this paper.
Bordley
Suppose an unforeseen event i occurs. \Ve now relabel event i as follows:
An Algorithm for Labelling Unforeseen Events 1. Identify how event i ra. tes on each of the m key characteristics.
2. Let r = m.
3. Determine whether there are any compound or atomic events which have the same first r characteristics as the unforeseen event.
4. Let P be the union of all such events. If P is nonempty, then label the unforeseen event as lp.
5.
If P is empty and r > 1 then let r = 1' -1 and return to step 3.
6. if P is empty and r = 1, then label the unforeseen event as /0.
2.2
Mapping F V Fe into the power set of F This algorithm maps all unforeseen events into the power set of F. Thus suppose our space of foreseen events consists of the three events lienee we have mapped the set of foreseen and unforeseen events, F V pc, into the power set of F.
EXPECTED UTILITY WITII NORMALIZED COMMONALITIES
Consistent with Assumption 0, we assume that u ( dl/0) = u0, d E D, i.e., if an unforeseen event bearing no resemblance to any foreseen event occurs, then its utility is the same given all decisions. Since this makes the occurrence of J0 irrelevant in determining the utility maximizing decision, we define new probabilities conditioned on its non-occurrence:
Then LA C F mA = 1 so that m satisfies the same formal properties as Shafer's ba. sic probability assignments. Equation(l)'s condition for preferring d to d* becomes 
where !AI is the number of atomic events in A. Given this assumption, equation (2) becomes Thus our analysis of unforeseen events leads us to replace additive subjective prob abilities by normalized commonalities.
Hence Bayesian theory, applied to a space of foreseen and unforeseen events, leads to expected utility theory with normalized commonalities replacing probabilities. If i.e., our probability function is bounded by Shafer's upper and lower probabilities. ---------------4Bordley & llazen(1991) present many examples of a suspicious decision maker who, presented with a lottery that seems too good to be true, instindively feels there must be a 'catch' somewhere.
Since Assumption 0 is refuted, an alternative way of assigning utilities to unfore seen events is necessary. This paper assumes tha. t a decision's utility given some unforeseen event equals that decision's utility given similar foreseen events. We also specify an algorithm for classifying which set of foreseen events is 'similar' to each of the various unforeseen events.
Our procedure is equivalent to replacing subjective probabilities defined over the space of foreseen and unforeseen events by random set theory probabilities over the space of foreseen events. The subjective probabilities appearing in the stan dard expected utility theory formula are now replaced by normalized commonali ties. So while others have viewed lower probabilities as a promising extension of Bayesian analysis (Gaines,1984; Good,1962; Smith, 1961; Williams, 1978; Dubois & Prade,1985) , this paper5 indicates that a certain variant of lower probability theory is implicit in Bayesian analysis given the appropriate assumptions on how unforeseen events are treated.
One could interpret our analysis as saying that a Bayesian decision theorist, con scious of the possibility of unforeseen events, w.ill inflate his assessed probability for an event E occurring so as to account for the occurrence of unforeseen events with consequences similar to event E. Since many psychological explanations of apparent irrationality in human decision making presume that individuals adjust probabil ities (Hogarth & Einhorn,1990) , the existence of unforeseen events may provide a partial explanation of such behavioral anomalies.
